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‘Negative externality’: The violence of capital and language 
Abstract 
This article explores the ‘normalized’ forms of violence (Objective and Symbolic) which 
lurk beneath the ‘subjective’ form of violence- which Zizek (2011) has defined as 
violence with an identifiable agent (from terrorism to street demonstrations to so-
called ethnic conflicts). Combining recent arguments- from the works of green/cultural 
criminologists (for example, Ruggiero, 2013; Ruggierro and South, 2013), and political 
economists (Zizek, 2009; 2011; 2014; Harvey, 2011; Varoufakis, 2013; Lazzarato, 
2011)- we explore the violence inherent in late modernity’s ‘governance through debt 
and fear’, showing how post-political bio-politics (Zizek, 2014) constructs the ‘other’ as 
a site of administration (through debt, incarceration, sanctions etc.) such that emergent 
‘insider’ and ‘outsiders’ positionalities determine whom justice is owed, and whom 
‘harm’ is ‘externalized’- that is discounted as a necessary condition of international 
order maintenance.  
Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to critique the conflicting logics of international criminal 
justice apropos of violence. By critically engaging with the (other) conceptualizations of 
violence we aim to show its ‘missing’, normalized, components together with the logic of 
such normalizations. Although there has been elaborate discussion of violence in recent 
analyses of the international criminal justice system- especially in recent reviews of the 
prosecution of high profile cases by ad hoc UN tribunals and at the International 
Criminal Court (ICC)- these analyses have emphasized understandings of violence 
which prejudices its ‘subjective’ form- which Zizek (2011:4) defines as ‘violence by an 
identifiable agent’- to the detriment of its other underlying forms. These other forms 
have been given passing acknowledgement as ‘background’ context. It is time, then, we 
looked at other two types of violence: Objective and Symbolic.  
In that book of his where Zizek (2011) engages with the harms of capital, he outlines 
two forms of systemic violence: First, there is ‘objective’ violence- staged by production 
and consumption in late modernity (see also, Bauman, 1989; Beck, 1992; Zizek, 2011; 
Hobsbawm, 1994); secondly, there is ‘symbolic’ violence- that of the domain of language 
and being (see also, Zizek, 2011; 2014; Chomsky, 2012). Alongside Zizek, we claim that 
Manuscript (anonymized)
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 2 
the subtle, normalised deployment of the other two forms of violence achieves the aim 
of constructing them as ‘externalities’ (Hayek, 1973)- the business lingo for the 
‘unintended consequences’ of doing business (which occur after the proper legal 
caveats have been served, so that ‘damage’ cannot be properly claimed by those to 
whom it would otherwise be due). This externalization, we further claim, is part of what 
Zizek (2011) has diagnosed as ‘post-political bio-politics’; a world view in which the goal 
of capitalist neoliberalism is the efficient management of people, which is achieved by 
detaching society from all forms of emancipatory thought and struggle so that the ‘rule 
of fear’ can carry the day. The purpose of the rule of fear is the deliberate construction 
of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’; those who are owed and those who owe: There are, on the 
one hand, those who are placed outside the protective ambit of international justice (in 
carceral archipelagos, such as Guantanamo bay, or ‘concentration’ camps for refugees) 
(Zizek, 2011; Kramer and Michalowski, 2005; Jamieson and McEvoy, 2005; Crelistein, 
2003) or outside the consumption ‘inner cycle’ (through debt) (Lazzarato, 2011; Zizek, 
2014; Moyo, 2009); then there are those who are placed within the protective ambit of 
law, those whose definition and interpretation of events is the only acceptable form 
(Chomsky, 2012;  Zizek, 2009; Kramer and Michalowski, 2005; Ruggiero and South, 
2013). Below, the reader will encounter these two camps, in; the analysis of post-
electoral violence, and its subsequent prosecution at the ICC, in Kenya; the European 
governance through debt (Lazzarato, 2011; Varoufakis, 2013; Zizek, 2014); African aid 
(Moyo, 2009); ‘tribal’ and ‘mineral’ conflict (Mamdani, 2001; 1996; Guest, 2004; Nugent, 
2004) and ecological destabilization across the world (Ruggiero and South, 2013; South, 
2010; Ruggiero, 2013).  
The point is that, behind the visible violence which exercises our attention menacingly 
lurks, other ‘invisible’ (?) forms of violence, so that the only way of completely ending 
the one is by ending the others: Zizek is already aware of this when he observes, 
apropos of the decades of Congolese conflict, that 
Congo no longer exists as a united operating state; its eastern part in particular is 
a multiplicity of territories ruled by local warlords controlling their patch of 
land…each warlord has business links to foreign companies of corporation 
exploiting the wealth- mostly mineral. This arrangement suits both partners: The 
corporation gets mining rights without paying taxes and so forth, while the 
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 3 
warlord gets paid… so in short, forget about the blaming the conflict on the 
‘savage customs’ of the local population: Just take away from the equation the 
foreign high-tech companies and the whole edifice of ‘ethnic warfare fuelled by 
old passions’ will fall apart’ (2014: 23) 
This is similar to the argument for ending piracy in the gulf of Eden: End the theft of that 
country’s sea wealth by European companies, and the edifice of ‘militant kidnappers’ 
will collapse (Ruggiero, 2013; Ruggiero and South, 2013). One should extend this claim 
further and suggest that, in order to properly prevent international crimes, we must 
also conceptualise their subjective forms (rapes, pogroms, ethnic cleansing…) along the 
contours of their underlying ideological forms (in the deliberate forms of language 
through which the elimination of the ‘other’ is arranged as a ‘final solution’ (Cohen, 
1995; Jamieson, 1999; Mamdani, 2001; Hobsbawm, 1994; Bauman, 1989): Yes, let us 
look at the pogroms, but let us also look at the system of international values which 
determines who receives or is denied justice- let us look at the ‘exceptionalism’ of 
international justice (Kailemia, 2016; Zizek, 2009).   
The article takes the following structure: First, we begin with a brief sketch of the other 
forms of violence, deploying interdisciplinary points of contact between political 
economy, linguistics and criminology. This is followed by a discussion of ‘objective’ 
violence, showing how it is normalized as part of ‘externality’; that is, its construction as 
a necessary condition of ‘order maintenance’. This then paves way for discussion of 
‘symbolic’ violence, showing how the ‘other’ is not only constructed (as the site of 
‘management’) but also normalized as deserving her plight. There are detours, after 
each section, respectively looking at the objective violence of the postcolonial state in 
Africa, and recent events in international criminal justice, including the plight of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) as the result, and site, of conflicting interests 
(between allies and rogue states). Before the last, small section offering a conclusion, we 
revisit the logic of post-political bio-politics, which is the hallmark of today’s global 
governance.   
Let us now look, one at a time, at the (other) forms of violence.  
Violence; Objective, subjective, symbolic  
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The standard notion of violence is that of acts of crime and terror, civil unrest, 
international conflicts and so forth. But, beyond the fascinating lure of ‘subjective 
violence’, lurks its disturbing background, which births and feeds it. This background is 
that of ‘objective’, or systemic, and ‘symbolic’ violence: Subjective violence is, in nuce, 
just the most visible portion of the triumvirate (see also, Zizek, 2011; 2012). Objective 
violence is mostly staged in the catastrophic consequences of the ‘smooth’ functioning 
of the political economy, from the ‘war industry’, to the ‘fundamentalism of the market’, 
to the displacements of the extractive mineral industry (see also Ruggiero, 2013; 
Ruggierro and South, 2013; Zizek, 2014; Harvey, 2011). This form of violence takes 
many forms and operates at different levels. Apropos of international (political) crimes 
and justice, however, it is most manifest in how society, exercising its functions through 
the state (and the international system of politics and commerce), distributes public 
‘goods’ and ‘bads’ (Stiglitz, 2012; Lazzarato, 2011); how the state includes or excludes 
certain of its subjects, from the ranks of those who bear the costs, benefits and/or 
harms of environmental exploitation, economic boom and/or busts, debt and wages and 
so on (Zizek, 2014; Lazzarato, 2011; Varoufakis, 2013).  
Where ‘subjective’ violence is the ‘acted out’, the ‘performed’ form of systemic conflict 
(Zizek, 2011) ‘symbolic’ violence is the province of ‘language proper’, of discourse, of 
‘naming’. Symbolic violence is embedded in what Heidegger (2000) calls ‘our house of 
being’; the milieu which makes man, as part and condition of his habitation, ‘man as 
such’- different from the other ‘beasts’. The claim here is that, it is precisely as a being 
possessed of linguistic capability that man relates to others and to the world around 
him. This relationship with phenomena around him is contoured by the linguistic 
worldview he develops or inherits: Relations of subservience and domination of others- 
and of nature- are reproduced in our habitual speech forms. More than that, there is 
violence in language as such, in naming- such as when we call a metal ‘gold’- as 
Chomsky (2014) shows- thus opening (what was otherwise a piece of rock) to 
exploitation, speculation, modification, sale, site of war and so forth.  
These two forms of violence as related: As Ruggiero and South (2013: 1) also observe, 
the exploitation of the environment and the global structures of social class and race has 
been facilitated by a hegemonic discourse under neoliberalism in which 
Neo‐liberal doctrines contradict their very axioms: namely, that the full costs of 
transactions must be borne by the involved parties. Many economic activities 
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 5 
and transactions, on the contrary, exact a significant price on humans and 
ecosystems, although conventional economists label such price with the 
reassuring euphemism ‘externalities’. In brief, neoliberalism regards 
environmental harm as accidental, unintentional and external – but also, 
unimportant (Ruggiero and South, 2013: 1).  
What Ruggierro and South are aware of is the role that discourse plays in how 
positionalities (of victory, defeat, victimization…) are constructed and sustained. We 
shall revisit the issues later on apropos of the neoliberal agenda, and specifically how it 
plays a hand in the global allocation of ‘goods’ and ‘bads’, including in criminal justice.  
Let us, for now, engage with the forms of violence, one at a time. 
‘Negative externalities’: Objective violence  
Apropos of ecological harms, White (2013: 255) has noted how ‘the most criminogenic 
agents of environmental harm within a global capitalist political economy are members 
of the capitalist class, operating within the institutional context of transnational 
corporations’. His point here is that the state- and the international system which it is 
part of- is the platform par excellence for political, economic, and environmental 
dialectical conflicts. In these conflicts competing sets of social interests are managed, 
through use-values involving direct utilization of natural and economic resources for 
subsistence, habitat, or recreation by citizens. The modern dialectical conflict also 
involves, as Ruggierro and South (2013) argue, struggles to maximize the ‘value’ from 
commodities-such as when we try to ‘grow’ more  animals and plants by application of 
technologies of husbandry and chemicals in agriculture. Maximization of value is not 
infinite, however, but is subject to the limitations of demographic growth, the earth’s 
‘carrying capacity’, but most importantly, the supply-demand alchemy of capitalist 
production (Harvey, 2011; Stiglitz, 2012). Others have observed how this dialectic plays 
out at the level of the state, which bears the (simultaneous) twin imperatives of 
enhancing economic development, on the one hand, and meeting the social needs of its 
constituents, on the other: 
In the first role, state officials seek to increase capital accumulation and tax 
revenues, in part through fostering greater industrial access to natural resources. 
Conversely, in their latter role, state agencies are pressured to provide clean air, 
clean water, and safe communities to their electorates. States thus oscillate 
under varying sets of social, economic and political pressures between syntheses 
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 6 
of this dialectic: the economic, in which use-values are largely dismissed, the 
managed scarcity, in which considerable volatility in state responses to 
exchange-value and use-value interests occur (Schnaiberg (1993: 1).  
The problem for the state here- and important for our ‘systemic’ notion of violence- is 
that struggles around (natural) resources in the modern era are primarily variants of 
the managed scarcity synthesis. These revolve around the limited capacities of most 
ecosystems to meet both exchange- and use-value needs, on the one hand, and the 
political-economic power of the competing interest groups, on the other (Ruggierro, 
2013). The complexity of the modern struggles (which play out at the state level) are 
enhanced because most use-value interested citizen groups also depend on wages, 
which are, in turn, a by-product of the modern treadmill of production, which uses 
profits from environmental extraction to develop more capital-intensive ways of 
extracting still more resources (Harvey, 2005; Zizek, 2014; Ruggierro and South, 2013). 
Under this ideology, capital owners and managers attempt to amplify the extraction of 
value by skewing citizen consciousness in two directions: (1) that resource extraction is 
compatible with citizen use-values, and (2) when this persuasion fails, that citizens' own 
exchange-value needs must take precedence over their use-value interests. This is the 
thesis of Lazzarato’s (2011) ‘indebted man’, where debt is deployed as a mechanism of 
governance, with the post-independence African state, for example, being pressured by 
multilateral lenders (and former colonial powers) to accept conditionalities even those 
which involve the transfer of the consequences of bad policies to its citizens already 
suffering from chronic scarcity of basic services (Mamdani, 1996; Wrong, 2009; Moyo, 
2009). As Lazzarato observes,  
‘The debtor-creditor relationship…intensifies the mechanisms of exploitation 
and domination at every level of society, for within it no distinctions exist 
between workers and the unemployed, consumers and producers, working and 
non-working populations, retirees and welfare recipients. Everyone is a debtor, 
accountable to and guilty before capital. Capital has become the great creditor, 
the universal creditor… Through the public debt entire societies become 
indebted. Instead of preventing ‘inequalities’, the latter exacerbates them (2011: 
8). 
What Lazzarato is teaching us is how, in today’s global capitalism, debt works across a 
whole range of social practices and levels, from a nation state down to an individual. As 
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 7 
part of the hegemony of neoliberalism (Zizek, 2014), the logic of market competition is 
extended to all aspects of social life, so that, for example, health and education- or even 
political decisions (voting) themselves- are perceived as investments made by the 
individual in his or her own dimension as an investor. The collective indebtedness, 
sometimes out of arrangements entered between ruling elites and multilateral lenders, 
are taken as collective entrepreneurial decisions by the citizens; national growth (in 
GDPs etc.) signals good investment decision-making (and is rewarded as such with 
more debt), while poor growth is an investment offence (punishable by downgrading of 
‘ratings’, or the rollback of investment in social safety nets).  
Along the same veins, the absence of ‘subjective’ violence, cue the absence of any forms 
of picketing-against depressed wages or bad investment decisions by national elites- is 
rewarded by high ratings in ‘ease of doing business’ or ‘transparency’ indices, so that, 
presently, the most draconian regimes (Ethiopia, Rwanda, China etc.) are also 
increasingly being held up as totems of good management to be envied and emulated.  
(We are daily reminded how much space the developing world needs to yield to 
international overseers- like the IMF, Transparency International, and the like, all 
located in western capitals- in order to get a fairer rating- the likes of Moody’s, Fitch- all 
located in western capitals: The easiest way for an African leader to be invited to Davos 
or the G7, as an ‘observer’, is not to provide clean water, or to widen democratic space, 
but to maintain a ‘stable outlook’, perhaps with their presence in these revered summits 
signalling wise decision-making by the subjects they oversee?) 
Alongside this logic, poverty is a diagnosis of poor decision-making, by the 
entrepreneur-of-the-self, so that it is right to punish this failure through the EU’s 
‘austerity measures’ (in the case of Greece in Europe) or International Monetary Fund 
IMF’s ‘structural adjustment programmes’ (in the case of Africa). In both instances, the 
ground is already rigged, to use a familiar metaphor, in favour of the one with 
something to show (cue capital) in regard to the endless rounds of entrepreneurship-of-
the-self-appraisals (see also, Lazzarato, 2011; Varoufakis, 2013). In the recent round of 
‘austerity Europe’, this appraisal of entrepreneurship means, for example, that the 
worker is no longer perceived as merely labour power, but as personal capital making 
good and bad ‘investment’ decision as s/he moves from job to job therein in/decreasing 
his/her net capital worth. The implication of this is that risks (financial, ecological, and 
psychological) are outsourced from the company and the state (or insurance and 
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 8 
banking institutions) to the individual: Social protections are individualized (privatized) 
to align them to market norms, and thus they are no longer guaranteed, but are 
conditional on the performance of the individual whose life is opened up for 
assessment. As Zizek (apropos of Lazzarato, 2011) observes; 
As individuals become poorer through the shrinkage of their salaries, and the 
removal of social provisions, neoliberalism offers them compensation through 
debt, and the promotion of shareholding. In this way, wages or pensions 
(deferred salaries) don’t rise but people have access to consumer credit and are 
encouraged to provide for retirement through personal share portfolios; people 
no longer have access to housing but have access to housing credit/mortgage; 
people no longer have access to higher education, but can take out student loans; 
mutual and collective protections are dismantled but people are encouraged to 
take out personal protections (2014:42).   
It is easy to relate this logic to the ‘subjective’ violence for which some African citizens 
have been indicted at the International Criminal Court: In the case of Kenya, to take one 
example, the (post-electoral) violence of 2007/08i, may have been co-perpetrated by 
the indicted ‘Ocampo Six’ii, but this was only possible because of systematic assault on 
the mechanisms of governance of the Kenyan state, by a rentier economy presided by 
the Kleptocracy of Arap Moi (who ruled under a single party for 24 years). This rentier 
arrangement, as Warrah (2008) illustrates in ‘Missionaries, Mercenaries and Misfits’, also 
involved or occurred against the backdrop of micromanaged exchange-rate 
mechanisms, systematic dismantling of industry, decline in prices of primary 
commodities in international markets, collapse of the tourism industry from western 
imposed ‘travel advisories’ and so on. The impact of this toxic collusion/coincidence 
was damaging the capacity of the state to provided basics services, culminating in 
precisely the violence which characterises the standard notion of ‘state collapse’.  
‘Negative externality’ and the post-colonial state 
In essence, majority of the post-colonial states, have been brutalised by neoliberal 
policies pursued by the IMF and the ‘World Bank’, so that, slowly, the new economies of 
the post-colonial state, have not only ‘fallen away’ from the international system of 
‘trade’ – becoming basket cases of aid dependency, as Moyo (2008) argues in ‘dead aid- 
but have also become ‘management’ burdens; candidates for absorption into the debt 
economy (see also, Zizek, 2012). In this management fiasco, the IMF, WB, and a handful 
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 9 
of politicians, now decide for everyone which resources should take priority, which part 
of the national income should go into servicing which debt and so on. As such, the debt 
economy has deprived many citizens of political power, which had already been 
diminished through the concessions of colonial-era systematic dismantling of 
communal institutions (see, for example, Anderson, 2005; Nugent, 2004; Mamdani, 
1996). As Nugent also shows, the conflicts ravaging Africa (from the Congo wars, to the 
‘blood diamond’ conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone) should be read against the 
background of the systematic dismantling of community networks by the colonial 
economy: The violence which has characterised the past 50 years of post-colonial 
Africa’s experience, Nugent argues, is the result of systematic disenfranchisement, 
because 
Decolonization was such a fraught affair because it involved a transfer of power, 
at two levels simultaneously: That is, from European officials to African 
politicians and from chiefs to locally elected leaders. The electoral principle, 
which had never found favour amongst the colonial authorities, was now 
formally enshrined as the basis on which the right to command 
rested…Throughout the first half of the 20th century, chiefs had been the most 
trusted intermediaries of the colonial regimes, only to find themselves jilted at 
the alter of independence’ (2004: 110). 
The implication of this ‘jilting’ is not only that the post-colonial state inherited 
weakened community structures of command, but that such inherited structures were 
infused with the colonial apparatus of ‘divide and rule’, involving governance through 
patronage and terror by the post-colonial elites (See also, Mamdani, 2001; Guest, 2004): 
A common pattern of the post-colonial state, Nugent tells us, was the systematic 
dismantling of devolved government in favour of centralized control using peripheral 
cronies installed by the power of the day. In tandem, the post-colonial indigenization of 
the economy was also its ethnicization, so that the fertile lands, the mineral rich regions, 
and important arms of government and the economy (tourism, military, policing, 
agriculture) were in the control of the ‘tribe’ in power. In ‘citizen and subject’ Mahmood 
Mamdani (2006) renders the post-colonial state as a form of decentralized despotism’, 
exercised by chiefs who owed their allegiance to their new masters with the same zeal 
they displayed for the colonial masters.  
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This reading is important for two reasons: First, because the survival of the 
‘decentralized despot’ was guaranteed not by the allegiance of those he ruled, but by the 
mercies of the appointing authority (in the state/tribal HQ), he was more mindful of the 
welfare of the centre than the periphery. This also meant that any challenge to the 
centre was confronted at the periphery and vice versa (with some chiefs exercising 
more power than cabinet ministers in the regimes of Kenyatta and Moi, in Kenya) 
(Mamdani, 1996; Guest, 2004). Secondly, with the local despots seized of the business of 
‘putting out fires’, the elites at the centre could carry out the business of dismantling 
anything that stood in the way of ‘masters abroad’ (Nugent, 2004; Moyo, 2008). The 
implication is that as the states grew their GDPs (and earned more foreign exchange) 
these benefits did not truckle down to the peripheries, so that in most states there are 
still no roads outside the capital cities (Warrah, 2008; Nugent, 2004; Guest, 2004).  
Such export of value, where the finance accumulated and was later transferred outside 
the countries (through tax evasion or use of offshore accounts to hide loot by the 
political elite) not only tilted the economies in favour of exports of primary 
commodities, but it also ‘politicised the economic and economised the political’ (Guest, 
2004): In order to guarantee trade, industrialists invested in the rentier economy by 
‘buying’ the support and/or allegiance of politicians and politicians who, in turn, looted 
the more, lining the pockets for the next battle for political survival. Thus, to be in 
politics was about becoming wealthy (as opposed to public service) and to be wealthy 
became participating and surviving in politics.  
There is wonderful documentation of the ‘shackled continent’ (2004) resulting from 
this, again itemizing the precise links between post-colonial corruption and the creation 
of zero-sum politics. There are even critical readings of the links between the pre-
colonial, the colonial and post-colonial state-building and genocides, such as the 
wonderful ethnographies by Jamieson (1999) on ‘genocide and the social reproduction 
of immorality’ and Mamdani’s (2001) account of ‘the victims who became killers’ in the 
Rwandese genocide. A similar reading is appropriate apropos of Kenya which, as we 
claimed above, has developed under the forces of a post-colonial rentier economy in 
which on the one hand, its political elites have looted just about anything (including 
engaging each other in political tuff wars), but in which, on the other hand, the presence 
of the state has mostly been felt only when the machinery of government is crashing 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 11 
revolt (through a dreaded ‘provincial administration’ apparatus of chiefs and the police) 
(See also, Warrah, 2008; Guest, 2004; Nugent, 2004; Wrong, 2009)iii.  
In repetition, the notion of objective violence is not a new theme: Marx was already 
aware of it when, in The communist manifestoiv, he highlighted the ‘mad dance of 
capital’; how, for example, the self-enhancing circulation of capital (in today’s meta-
reflexive speculations of ‘derivatives’, ‘futures’, ‘IPOs’…) can also happen against 
concerns for human or environmental harms. The point here is not so much about 
economic speculation as a form of violence (although there are many instances in which 
that is the case), but how the normalization of this speculation (and other forms of 
value- extraction) are distanced from their impact; how bloody conflict, for example, is 
conveniently explained as ‘tribal rivalry’, or ‘spontaneous’ reaction to electoral theft, 
without acknowledging the connections of this spontaneity or ‘tribe’, to the schism in 
the economy.  
In other words, the problem of systemic violence is that, as a hidden and normalized 
form of violence, is not easy to render in the 24hr newscasts (especially when the media 
conglomerates have a stake in the conditions which give rise to the reportable-violence) 
(Chomsky, 2012). Or, as Zizek also argues 
The fundamental systemic violence of capitalism, much more uncanny than any 
direct pre-capitalist socio-ideological violence…is no longer attributable to 
concrete individuals and their ‘evil intentions’, but is purely objective , systemic, 
anonymous… One can experience this gap in a palpable way when one visits a 
country where life is obviously in shambles. We see a lot of ecological decay and 
human misery. However, the economists’ report that one reads afterwards 
informs us that the country’s economic situation is ‘financially sound’- reality 
doesn’t matter, what matters is the situation of capital…’ 
Symbolic violence: ‘Corporate social responsibility’ 
As we saw at the introduction, the (international) discourse on rights and wrongs, law, 
justice is contoured by language, so that international institutions underwritten by 
notions of values derived from one culture may not necessarily engage with meanings of 
acts when committed within another culture. More than that, the very framework of 
international institutions, including the ICC, and international human rights laws for 
that matter, may emphasize the meanings of events which are compliant with the 
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interests of dominant cultures (even where such are packaged as ‘universal values’). 
Chomsky is aware of this when he points out how 
The terms of political discourse typically have two meanings. One is the 
dictionary meaning, and the other is a meaning that is useful to serving power- 
the doctrinal meaning. Take democracy. According to the common-sense 
meaning, a society is democratic to the extent that people can participate in a 
meaningful way in managing their affairs. But the doctrinal meaning is different- 
it refers to a system in which decisions are made by sectors of the business 
community and related elites. The public are to be only ‘spectators of action’ and 
not ‘participants’ (2012: 64).  
Chomsky’s reading of the (symbolic) power of language is important not only because of 
the contact it makes with the aforementioned emergence of the individual as the site of 
risks (Lazzarato, 2011; Zizek, 2014), but because he develops the motif further into 
international relations showing how, for example, notions such as ‘justice’ and ‘peace’ 
acquire different meanings as they transit the refracting lenses of international power 
games: 
Take defense against aggression, a phrase that’s used- predictably- to refer to 
aggression. When the US attacked South Vietnam, the liberal hero Adlai 
(Stevenson) explained that we were defending South Vietnam against ‘internal 
aggression’- that is, the aggression of the south Vietnamese peasants against the 
US air force and a US- run mercenary army which were driving them out of their 
homes into concentration camp, where they could be ‘protected’ from the 
southern guerrillas (2012: 64).   
There is similar critique of ‘American exceptionalism’ apropos of international law- and 
very useful for the purpose of analysing symbolic violence- which is perhaps best 
rendered by the narrative below.  
Necessity of harm; the ‘negative externality’ of allies  
In June 2015, the ICC sensationally sought the arrest and repatriation of Sudan’s Al 
Bashir- the first sitting head of state indicted for war crimes and crime against 
humanity- during an African Union Heads of States Summit in South Africav. Despite a 
court order for his detention, however, the South African government refused to arrest 
and hand-over Al Bashir, thus breaking its obligation as an ICC member. South Africa’s 
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principle argument was that the ICC, in calling for Bashir’s arrest, had intentionally 
placed itself in conflict with the 2014 resolution of AU that no sitting head of state shall 
be summoned to ICC hearings- and an even older grant of immunity to heads of states 
within territory of the AU membership. During the ensuing drama the US state 
department expressed its frustration in South Africa’s reluctance to arrest Al Bashir. 
The US State Department spokesman John Kirby said that while the U.S. is not a part of 
the ICC, it strongly supports efforts to hold accountable the perpetrators of genocide 
and war crimes. As such, "In light of the atrocities in Darfur, we call on the government 
of South Africa to support the international community's efforts to provide justice for 
the victims of these heinous crimesvi," Kirby said in a statement.  
Critics of the US position contrasted this enthusiasm for the arrest of ‘yet another 
African’ with the US criticism of any involvement of the ICC in the Israeli bombings of 
Gaza, which a UN report has described as ‘possible war crimesvii’. No surprise then that 
the South African government issued a rejoinder to the US State Department, pointing 
out that: 
‘The ANC holds the view that the International Criminal Court is no longer useful 
for the purposes for which it was intended. Countries, mainly in Africa and 
Eastern Europe ... continue to unjustifiably bear the brunt of the decisions of the 
ICC, with Sudan being the latest example.’viii 
The ANC’s criticism of the ICC is in line with the African Union’s (AU) which has 
consistently highlighted that, since its inception, the ICC has only prosecuted Africans. 
The AU sees this as a betrayal of the spirit of the Rome statute- and a slap in the face on 
the vain hopes of those like Kofi Annan who viewed the ICC as a ‘triumph of humanity’ 
(Zizek, 2014: 333)ix. Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn of Ethiopia, a former AU 
chairperson, has claimed that the ICC process ‘has degenerated into some kind of race 
hunting’x. Kenya’s Kenyatta- a co-indictee with 5 others on crimes against humanity 
committed in 2007- has gone further to claim that 
‘The ICC has been reduced into a painfully farcical pantomime, a travesty that 
adds insult to the injury of victims. It stopped being the home of justice the day it 
became the toy of declining imperial powers’xi.  
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These sentiments are in line with wider criticisms of the ICC, including that by the 
influential Black Agenda Magazine, which pointed out that: 
It’s a travesty of justice that the ICC only indicts Africans, but even more 
importantly, the International Criminal Court also only indicts those politicians 
that get on the wrong side of the United States and the former colonial powers in 
Africa. The ICC is a tool of U.S. foreign policy, an instrument of neo-colonialismxii’’ 
(Black Agenda Magazine, 2013). 
Criticism of US double standards would appear to be justifiedxiii: As Chomsky’s (2012) 
points out, the US has actively vetoed any attempt by the Palestinian Authority to accede 
to full ICC membership- and recently threatened to withhold aid to Palestine should its 
government refer Israel to the ICCxiv. (Analysts have pointed out that any cut in U.S. 
funds would be deleterious to Palestinian self-rule, by plunging already struggling local 
institutions in the West Bank and Gaza into a struggle to survivexv.) U.S. President 
Barack Obama's administration has repeatedly said it does not believe Palestine is a 
sovereign state and therefore does not qualify to be part of the ICC. Apropos of 
Palestine’s application to the ICC, Lindsey Graham, part of a seven-member delegation 
of US senators visiting Israel, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, said existing U.S. legislation 
‘would cut off aid to the Palestinians if they filed a complaint’ against Israel. At a news 
conference in Jerusalem, Graham called the Palestinian step "a bastardising of the role 
of the ICC’ which is ‘incredibly offensive.’xvi Graham also warned that  
‘We will push back strongly to register our displeasure. It is already part of our 
law that would require us to stop funding if they actually bring a case.’xvii  
Traditionally, the US has been critical of any contact between Palestine and the ICC, 
especially since majority of UN member states voted to recognize Palestine as non-
member state in 2010. (In 2014 the US actually vetoed the UN Security Council 
Resolution 242, which obliged Israel to commit to a deadline for withdrawal from 
occupied territories.)xviii Unsurprisingly, when Palestine referred Israel to the ICC in 
2015, the US and Israeli opposition was uniform: Israel, a key ally on ‘the war on terror’, 
needed to be protected and encouraged, not ‘threatened’. As Netanyahu put it:  
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‘At a time when terrorism is attacking the free world, this step will hurt 
international efforts to fight terrorism… The decision by the prosecutor at the 
International Criminal Court … gives legitimacy to international terrorism’’(The 
Jerusalem Post, 2015). 
 This was echoed by Diane Feinstein, the US senator from Californian, who pointed out 
that 
 ‘The United States must aggressively oppose this court each step of the way, 
because the treaty establishing an International Criminal Court is not just bad, 
but I believe it is also dangerous… None of us would like to see a court that 
frivolously prosecutes Americans or which acts with politics, not justice as its 
motivating force’xix. 
Similarly, in a debate in the US senate, Rand Paul claimed that groups such as the ICC 
‘that threaten Israel cannot be allies of the USxx’ and that the US senate should ‘continue 
to do everything in its power to make sure this president and this Congress stop 
treating Israel’s enemies as American allies’xxi. Feinstein’s and Paul’s assessment of the 
ICC’s mandate is not unique; it represents the paradox of US’ opportunistic exception- 
where the ICC is to be opposed when it threatens the foreign policy interests of the US, 
but supported when its success does not threaten the same interests (Zizek, 2009; 
2014; Chomsky, 2014; Kailemia, 2016). Chomsky (2012) is most clinical when he 
observes how, apropos of the ‘peace process’  
The term process refers to what the US government is doing- in the cases 
mentioned; this is to block international efforts to seek peace… The peace 
process is limited to US initiatives, which call for a unilateral US-determined 
settlement with no recognition of Palestinian national rights. That is the way it 
works (2012: 65). 
The point Chomsky is trying to make is that, under today’s rule by a single superpower, 
only one type, one definition, of violence- the one the US recognises- is acceptable:  
Everything else (from ‘targeted’ killings, to wars, to injustices) are the ‘cost of doing 
good in a dangerous world’- the unintended, collateral damage (Zizek, 2009; Kramer 
and Michalowski, 2005; Lippens, 2004). Hayek, invoking the economists’ lingua, refers 
to this as ‘externalities’; that is, the logic of business in which ‘actions that are not 
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manifestly intended to cause harm to others cannot become the subject of rules of 
conduct’ (Hayek 1973: 101). In practice this implies, as Hayek argues, that ‘some harm 
knowingly caused to others is even essential for the preservation of spontaneous order’, 
in the same sense, for example, the law cannot prohibit ‘the setting up of a new business 
even if this will lead to the failure of another’ (Hayek 1973: 102). In this articulation, law 
and legality incorporate a range of conflicting expectations so that the prerogative is to 
decide which one prevails. This experimental approach to business is not harmful in 
theory, especially when, as Ruggiero and South (2013) apropos of Hayek (1973) show, 
it is not (always) possible or desirable to prevent all actions which will harm others but 
only certain kinds of actions.  The problematic is when this justification for the necessity 
or desirability of harm is accompanied by a view the entitlement of others as a subject 
of constant review and change. In the same way that the purpose of ‘externalization’, in 
Hayek’s (1973: 107) words, is ‘the establishment of the precise boundaries within 
which action is acceptable’, the purpose of ‘externalization’ in international justice 
(including ecosystem justice) is the demarcation of a range of ‘objects over which only 
particular individuals are allowed to dispose and from the control of which all others 
are excluded’ (Hayek 1973: 107).  
The genius of Hayek is thus the distinction he makes between meum and tuum (‘mine’ 
and ‘thine’); by drawing boundaries, the aim of the law is merely to prevent, as much as 
possible, the actions of different individuals from interfering with each other. The 
problem here- and important for a contextualized approach to ‘international crimes- is 
that the law cannot be concerned with the effects of such actions on different 
individuals, so that justice should not be concerned with the results of the various 
transactions but only with whether the transactions themselves are fair. Harm against 
humans and the environment, therefore, may be a fair outcome of economic initiative; 
or, ‘perpetration of violence’, say over stolen elections, should be prosecuted as buying 
and using a machete (or harming groups for violence)- and not having had your land 
stolen and reallocated to collaborators of the colonial regime, for example.  
This is the wall that recent prosecutions of ‘masterminds’ of crimes against humanity in 
Kenya hit: Although the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) endeavoured (correctly, as per 
the terms of her brief) to present the cases as the conflicts between ethnic groups each 
seeking to preserve or acquire power, there was little context to how this power has 
been acquired, lost, or preserved in the post-colonial state (see also Wrong, 2009; 
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Kailemia, 2016). What this means is that any engagement with the subjective violence of 
gang rapes and machetes is only complete when it also adequately engages with the 
crime in toto- with the crime in question as a form of ‘produced immorality’ (Jamieson, 
1999), as a form of and the result of ‘social exclusion’. As Jamieson argues apropos of 
the Rwandese genocide, the near-elimination of Tutsis (by extremist Hutus) was not 
merely a spontaneous eruption of ethnic hatred (say a response to the assassination of 
president Habyarimana) but something more sinister:  
Genocide is a project of elimination which involves extensive planning, 
coordination (and allocation of resources) by a few, and implementation by 
many. The publicly articulated and legitimizing arguments for such elimination 
normally identifies the annihilation of  a particular targeted ‘outsider’ group as a 
rational process that will contribute to ‘public good’, that is of the inside group’ 
(1999: 135).  
‘Living in the end times’; Post-political bio-politics 
Alongside this logic, the international system’s articulation of the ‘public good’ we 
should all desire, together with its ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, has been diagnosed by 
Zizek (2008) as ‘post-political bio-politics’; that is, a type of (international) politics which 
claims to ‘leave everything behind’ (old ideological struggles, old injustices…) to achieve 
the primary goal of the efficient administration of life (pp. 34). The purpose of post-
political bio-politics, Zizek argues, is objectification of social life, so that it can be 
administered through fear: Instead of radical emancipation, the political subject is 
encouraged to accept and move on (forget apartheid, forget the stolen money in 
offshore accounts, just create a conducive environment for investors, acquire new 
voting machines…). Conversely, post-political bio-politics deploys fear as its mobilizing 
principle (in the interests of the ruling elites): fear of immigrants, fear of the other tribe, 
fear of crime (and especially terrorism, nowadays), fear of godless sexual depravity etc. 
Thus, in the last decade the big events have been the rise of right wing parties in Europe, 
on the one hand, and the rise of so-called tribal conflicts in parts of Africa (Kailemia, 
2016). In this post-political discourse the ‘other’, the outsider, is to be put at a distance, 
not embraced. (This, perhaps, explains the liberal obsessions with charity: For 5p a day, 
we can clothe the children in Congo- or give drinking water to poor Somali- as long as 
the subject of our charity lives with all the consequences of outsourced harms ((from 
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our consumption patterns)) and does not escape his environment into ours.) This 
means that the other is at once the object of our distance affection, which of course 
dissipates the moment the ‘other’ ceases to be a distant fantasy, materializing in our 
shores in the traumatizing figure of a neighbour (refugee, asylum seeker, job seeker…). 
Apropos of this ‘distance love’, Zizek reads a parallel with ‘outsourced international 
justice’ on which post-political bio-politics hinges: 
That of the reduction of humans to ‘bare life’, to homo sacer, that so-called sacred 
being who is subject of expert caretaking knowledge, but is excluded, like 
prisoners in Guantanamo bay, or Holocaust victims, from all rights’ (2012: 35)xxii.  
Zizek is not alone: Criminologists (for example Crelistein, 2003; O’Reilly, 2005; Lippens, 
2004; Kramer and Michalowski, 2005; Aas, 2007; Gros, 2003) see homology between 
this logic of exceptionalism and globalization of international criminal justice. Crelistein 
demonstrates how torture- which is a violation of Geneva protocols and the Rome 
Statute- has been ‘outsourced’, that is left, to the (Third World) allies of the US which 
can do it without worrying about legal problems or public protest- or where there are 
guarantees to ‘allies’ of US veto in the UNSC. Here, neo-liberal values in the west are 
sustained against the background of carceral archipelagos such as Guantanamo Bay and 
Diego Garcia where the global policeman can do to others what it would not consider 
doing to itself (Zizek, 2010, 2014; Jamieson and McEvoy, 2005).  
But, Mutatis mutandis, the same can be said of the construction the African ‘other’, not 
only by the international powers, but, surprisingly, by the African Union- an elite club of 
African leaders which meets regularly to elect one of them as the chairman of Africa, 
and to plot ways of protecting one another. The AU’s apparent obsession with the 
ethnicities of the indicted deters the proper perspective on; firstly, the hypocrisy of 
wanting to appropriate the ‘colonial immunity’ (Chomsky, 2014) allegedly enjoyed by 
so-called major powers (Russia, China, US and their protégés); secondly, the ‘invisibility’ 
of the internally displaced people, such as Kenyan victims of alleged crimes against 
humanity who are still languishing in ‘IDP’ camps?xxiiiWhen the AU at the urging of the 
Kenyan president convened an ‘extraordinary session’ of the AU to deliberate on the 
continent’s relationship with the ICC (for example in February 2016 where a decision to 
commence the block’s pull-out from the court’s membership was agreed) shouldn’t the 
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focus rather be on the visible contrast between the plight of victims of state crimes 
across Africa, with the complaint by the incoming chairman of that block that 
‘Elsewhere in the world, many things happen, many flagrant violations of human rights, 
but nobody cares’’xxiv? It is as if the debate on the future of the ICC has degenerated into 
a ‘pissing contest’ – who should be allowed to abuse the process more, rather than what 
should be done to ensure none of the perpetrators get away with their crimesxxv.  
Perhaps the ICC’s Achilles’ heel in Africa is that it has attempted to offer a juridical 
solution to a political problem that reaches beyond the activity of the visible agents 
whom it is possible to drag into the courts. By contrast, the violence staged over 
elections is the result of wider, and deeply seated, problems of the post-colonial state’s 
political economy (Mamdani, 2001; Jamieson, 1999). This is not to deny that the ICC can 
be active in prosecuting such crimes, or that the ICC’s efforts are in vain, until all the 
other forms of violence have been resolved: Rather, it is an argument that the ICC is only 
a part of the solution to the violence- in this instance it is only effective against one type 
of it. Actually, in equipping the ICC with adequate teeth to deal with the gravest 
atrocities, the court’s framers were also aware that treaty ratification would be difficult 
unless certain limitations were in place to assuage the concerns of states with prior 
prolonged periods of conflict - or those which through other apparatus, such as ‘Truths 
and Reconciliation Commissions’, had managed to put their demons to rest (Stanley, 
2005; Mamdani, 2001). 
Unfortunately, however, this also implies that, even for logistical reasons alone, it is 
impossible and/or unnecessary to prosecute most instances of systematic human rights 
violations by states, even where they are carried out under conditions which should 
require referral to the ICC or the OTP’s motu proprio. In respect of the Kenyan cases 
before the ICC, although the country’s ethnic cleansing history stretched way back to 
post-independence Kenya (Anderson, 2005; Wrong, 2009) the details of the systematic 
use of the electoral cycle for rape and displacement of population can only provide 
contextual background- and cannot be substantive evidence of the involvement of the 
indicted (in previous rounds of ethnic clashes), as Fayal Gaynor, counsel for victims has 
repeatedly showed in the trial of William Ruto and Joshua Sangxxvi.  
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The point we should not miss is how the effectiveness of the ICC is hindered by those, 
like the AU, the US (and some other members of the UN Security Council), are wont to 
lend support to the court- or to stand out of its way- only whenever such help is in line 
with or does not threaten their national interest.  
Conclusion 
Harvey (2011:80), diagnosing the neo-liberal condition observes that: 
The drive towards market freedoms and the commodification of everything can 
all too easily run amok and produce social incoherence. The destruction of forms 
of social solidarity leaves a gaping hole in the social order. It then becomes 
peculiarly difficult to combat anomie and control the resultant anti‐social 
behaviours such as criminality. (Harvey 2011: 80) 
Today, in turn, we should reflect on the ways in which social incoherence extends to 
forms of despoilation and acts that, as Walters (2010: 181) puts it, ‘create devastating 
conditions for the lives of local people’, but, yet involve the condoning, denial and 
‘business as usual’ stance to the suffering and victimization of the ‘other’. When we do 
this, the inevitable conclusion is that in order for universal international criminal justice 
to be secured, the logic of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ mapped above (in the shape of 
objective and symbolic violence) must be challenged, and ultimately destroyed. The 
tribal logic of shielding ‘our own’, whether practiced by the African Union or by the US, 
or by corporations, is deleterious to equality in international criminal justice practice. 
The idea that one’s citizenship of the world can determine whether the good that comes 
her way is justified, or whether the bad that comes her way is a part of ‘the cost of 
maintaining order’ has been described above. But it is unacceptable.  
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i The 2007–08 Kenyan crisis was a political, economic, and humanitarian crisis that erupted in Kenya 
after incumbent president Mwai Kibaki was declared the winner of a disputed election, held on December 
27, 2007. Supporters of Kibaki's opponent, Raila Odinga, alleged electoral manipulation and took to the 
streets in so-called ‘mass action’. The ensuing violence left more than 1300 people dead, and close to 
650000 internally displaced. 6 people (nicknamed the ‘Ocampo’ Six) including the present president 
Uhuru Kenyatta and his deputy- formerly on opposite sides of the violence- were indicted by the 
International criminal court for crimes against humanity. All the cases have ‘collapsed’, after a collective 
pre-trial and trial period of 5 years. The cases have become a case study for the ICC’s relationship with 
Africa, exposing the positionalities of global powers when it comes to the business of the ICC, as Kailemia 
(2016) argues.  
ii On the 7th and 8th of April 2011 the Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
convened to hear for the first time in the Hague the six individuals of the Kenyan Situation suspected of 
Crimes against Humanity. These came to be ‘known as the ‘Ocampo Six’ following a public naming by the 
then prosecutor of the ICC, Moreno Ocampo.  These six suspects were: William Samoei Ruto (Current vice 
president); Henry Kiprono Kosgey; the then member of Parliament and Chairman of the ODM Party; 
Joshua Arap Sang, Head of Operations at Kass FM in Nairobi, Kenya; Francis Kirimi Muthaura, the then 
Head of Public Service and Secretary to the Cabinet; Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta (Now president, then the 
deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, and; Mohammed Hussein Ali (then the commissioner of 
police). 
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iii My departure from recent accounts (including Mamdani’s ((2001)) and Jamieson ((1999)) is that, in 
privileging the ‘symbolic’ (which we turn to shortly) – in their reading of the visible divisions of ‘Hutu’ 
and ‘Tutsi’, for example- they miss precisely how colonialism, as the organizing form of ‘othering’ par 
excellence, was very much about the structures of the economy, so that the symbolic, as important as it 
was, was nonetheless the means to the end; the management of the colonial ‘rape’ of the African economy. 
 
iv See Marx, Karl (1978) Collected works volume 10, London, Lawrence and Wishart.  
v See: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-33269126 
 
vi See the full statement at: www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/06/243793.htm 
vii http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/30/world/middleeast/report-cites-possible-war-crimes-in-
israeli-hunt-for-ambushed-soldier.html?_r=0 
 
viii See http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/06/15/us-africa-summit-bashir-icc-
idUSKBN0OU0K420150615 
 
ix The most pronounced criticism has been on the question of national sovereignty: The African Union 
(AU) has specifically opposed indictments of sitting heads of stateix while global powers, including the 
United States, Russia and China, have refused to ratify the Rome Statuteix on fear that the court could be 
used for politically motivated prosecutions of their officials or soldiers working outside their borders. 
xHttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/10082819/International-
Criminal-Court-is-hunting-Africans.html 
xisee http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2013/10/icc-toy-of-declining-imperial-powers-uhuru/ 
xii To be fair, the ICC has what could, for want of a better phrase, be loosely referred to as ‘inbuilt 
inconsistencies’, or windows of abuse, such as how the court should deal with supra-national entities, 
such as terrorist organizations or ethnic militias. We should recall the difficulty alluded above in our 
reading of the works of Stanley (2005) on ‘juridical othering’ (especially the use of militias, or ‘special 
forces’) and O’Reilly’s (2010) discussion of ‘private contractors’. It is a given that, due to the nature of 
intentional crimes, and how they come to the attention of the ICC (via UNSC referral, Own state referral or 
the OTP’s motu proprio) there is a major grey area whereby appendages of a regime can carry out major 
violations of international law camouflaged as ‘common criminality’. A notable post-Rome Statute 
resolution of this conundrum is the indictment of senior leadership of the Janjaweed militia and Sudanese 
officials in the case of War crimes in Darfur presently before the ICC. 
 
xiii As others have pointed out, criticism of the court should also be put into context:  ICC operation must 
be understood within the context of the court’s recent creation, administrative and personnel challenges, 
legal impediments imposed by the Roma Statute, and external pressure to prosecute as many cases as 
possible in order to satisfy its value-oriented goal of guaranteeing lasting respect for and the enforcement 
of international justice (Basiouni, 2005)xiii. As Basiouni shows, these factors have made the choices of the 
prosecutor largely inevitable, although a strong case can be made for fundamental future reform of OTP 
operation. Space does not permit an exhaustive appraisal of the ICC’s effectiveness (or lack thereof) when 
it comes to non-state actors. Perhaps this is fine for these purposes, since this is the area in which the ICC 
has received the least criticism from African states: There is little criticism of the prosecution of the 
Congolese Bosco Ntagada or the arrest warrant for the LRA’s Joseph Kony, for war crimes.    
 
xiv http://mondoweiss.net/2015/01/palestinians-consequences-settlements 
xv The U.S. supplies more than $400 million annually to the Palestinian Authority, but Israel has, following 
Palestine’s accession to the ICC, frozen a monthly transfer of some $120 million in tax revenues it collects 
for the Palestinians. This move was criticised by the EU as a breach of the 1993 Oslo accords. 
xvi http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/01/19/us-usa-israel-palestinians-idUSKBN0KS24Z20150119 
 
xvii http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/01/19/us-usa-israel-palestinians-idUSKBN0KS24Z20150119 
 
xviii See: https://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/index-of-countries-on-the-security-council-
agenda/israel-palestine-and-the-occupied-territories.html 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 25 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
xix See: http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/africa-in-focus/posts/2013/10/17-africa-international-
criminal-court-kimenyi 
xx http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2014/11/13/israel-is-the-middle-east-ally-the-
us-cannot-lose 
xxi http://www.newrepublic.com/article/120953/senators-threaten-cut-palestinian-funding-over-icc-
membership 
 
xxii As Kailemia (2016) argues, the implications of this logic to post-Rome Statute international criminal 
justice is that states are now competing to appropriate to themselves this incivility or that the services of 
transnational and supra-national actors are required in order to circumvent state obligation under 
international law. Where this quest goes awry, and the ICC is invoked, two scenarios ensue: Based on 
positionalities of the international political pecking order there may be requirement to comply with the 
court, to dismiss the court as ‘out of step’. (It helps if you are number of countries.) Alternatively, states 
can cut lose and hand-over the ‘baddies’. The conflicts Africa, under the leadership of the AU, is having 
with the court have to do with the first scenario. On the second scenario, Africa’s relationship with the ICC 
is a template of the challenges of a globalizing world, which is being driven (as Lippens, 2004) 
appropriately claims, by a neoliberal logic of empire: For some parts of the world, post-cold-war narrative 
of universal justice is an ambition built on the back of ‘outsourced’ illiberalism (Chomsky, 2014; Zizek, 
2014). 
xxiii See: https://research.unsw.edu.au/projects/investigating-health-needs-vulnerable-people-living-
internally-displaced-persons-idp-camps 
 
xxiv http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/01/african-union-kenyan-plan-leave-international-
criminal-court 
 
xxv The other point not to be missed is how most of the critiques of the ICC homologise its many arms: 
Isn’t the critique of ‘race hunting’ not more a critique of the priorities of the Office of the prosecutor, than, 
say, the presidency- or the different pre-trial and trial chambers? In fact, while criticism of the court’s 
‘selective justice’ was raging within the ranks of the AU, the pre-trial chamber (in the Kenyan case) 
dismissed the cases of 3 of the co-accused (Mr Muthaura, Mr Hussein and Mr Kosgey), while Mr. 
Kenyatta’s case was withdrawn by the OTP shortly before it went to trial in December, 2014. 
xxvi In the case of Kenya, certainly, the post-election violence of 2007 was a continuation of previous inter-
ethnic conflicts, which had flared up in the past, encouraged by Arap Moi’s single-party dictatorial regime. 
Pejoratively referred to as ‘land clashes’, they had become state-sponsored land-grabs in which one 
community was evicted out of their farms around election-time every 5 years. Invariably, these were 
members of the Kikuyu ethnic group which were allied to the political opposition during the 2007 
conflict, but which were perceived as part of the ‘eating’ group- owing to one of their own occupying 
power in 2007xxvi. 
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